How to Sequentialize Independent Parallel Attacks? - Biased Distributions Have a Phase Transition by Bogos, Sonia Mihaela & Vaudenay, Serge
How to Sequentialize Independent Parallel Attacks?
Biased Distributions Have a Phase Transition
Sonia Bogos⋆ and Serge Vaudenay
EPFL
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
{soniamihaela.bogos, serge.vaudenay}@epfl.ch
Abstract. We assume a scenario where an attacker can mount several indepen-
dent attacks on a single CPU. Each attack can be run several times in independent
ways. Each attack can succeed after a given number of steps with some given and
known probability. A natural question is to wonder what is the optimal strategy
to run steps of the attacks in a sequence. In this paper, we develop a formalism to
tackle this problem. When the number of attacks is infinite, we show that there is
a magic number of steps m such that the optimal strategy is to run an attack for
m steps and to try again with another attack until one succeeds. We also study the
case of a finite number of attacks.
We describe this problem when the attacks are exhaustive key searches, but the
result is more general. We apply our result to the learning parity with noise (LPN)
problem and the password search problem. Although the optimal m decreases as
the distribution is more biased, we observe a phase transition in all cases: the
decrease is very abrupt from m corresponding to exhaustive search on a single
target to m = 1 corresponding to running a single step of the attack on each target.
For all practical biased examples, we show that the best strategy is to use m = 1.
For LPN, this means to guess that the noise vector is 0 and to solve the secret by
Gaussian elimination. This is actually better than all variants of the Blum-Kalai-
Wasserman (BKW) algorithm.
1 Introduction
We assume that there are an infinite number of independent keys K1,K2, . . . and that
we want to find at least one of these keys by trials with minimal complexity. Each key
search can be stopped and resumed. The problem is to find the optimal strategy to run
several partial key searches in a sequence. In this optimization problem, we assume that
the distributions Di for each Ki are known. We denote D = (D1,D2, . . .). Consider the
problem of guessing a key Ki, drawn following Di, which is not necessarily uniform.
We assume that we try all key values exhaustively from the first to the last following a
fixed ordering. If we stop the key search on Ki after m trials, the sequence of trials is
denoted by ii · · · i = im. It has a worst-case complexity m and a probability of success
which we denote by PrD(im).
Instead of running parallel key searches in sequence, we could consider any other
attack which decomposes in steps of the same complexity and in which each step has
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a specific probability to be the succeeding one. We assume that the ith attack has a
probability PrD(im) to succeed within m steps and that each step has a complexity 1.
The fundamental problem is to wonder how to run steps of these attacks in a sequence
so that we minimize the complexity until one attack succeeds. For instance, we could
run attack 1 for up to m steps and decide to give up and try again with attack 2 if it fails
for attack 1, and so on. We denote by s= 1m2m3m · · · this strategy. Unsurprisingly, when
the Di’s are the same, the average complexity of s is the ratio CD(1
m)
PrD(1m) where CD(1
m) is
the expected complexity of the strategy 1m which only runs attack 1 for m steps1 and
PrD(1m) is its probability of success.
Traditionally, when we want to compare single-target attacks with different com-
plexity C and probability of success p, we use as a rule of the thumb to compare the
ratio Cp . Quite often, we have a continuum of attacks C(m) with a number of steps lim-
ited to a variable m and we tune m so that p(m) is a constant such as 12 . Indeed, the
curve of m 7→ C(m)p(m) is often decreasing (so has an L shape) or decreasing then increasing
(with a U shape) and it is optimal to target p(m) = 12 . But sometimes, the curve can
be increasing with a Γ shape. In this case, it is better to run an attack with very low
probability of success and to try again until this succeeds. In some papers, e.g. [14], we
consider min C(m)p(m) as a complexity metric to compare attacks. Our framework justifies
this choice.
LPN and Learning with Errors (LWE) [21] are two appealing problems in cryptog-
raphy. In both cases, the adversary receives a matrix V and a vector C =Vs+D where s
is a secret vector and D is a noise vector. For LPN, the best solving algorithm was pre-
sented in Asiacrypt 2014 [12]. It brings an improvement over the well-known BKW [5]
and its variants [15,11]. The best algorithm has a sub-exponential complexity.
Assuming that V is invertible, by guessing D we can solve s and check it with
extra equations. So, this problem can be expressed as the one of guessing a correct
vector D of small weight, which defines a biased distribution. Here, the distribution of
D corresponds to the weighted concatenation of uniform distributions among vectors of
the same weight. We can thus study this problem in our formalism. This was used in
[8]. This algorithm is also cited in [6] and by Lyubashevsky2.
Both LPN and LWE fall in the aforementioned scenario of guessing a k-bit biased
noise vector by a simple transformation. Work on breaking cryptosystems with biased
keys was also done in [18].
The guessing game that we describe in our paper also matches well the password
guessing scenario where an attacker tries to gain access to a system by hacking an ac-
count of an employee. There exists an extensive work on the cryptanalytic time-memory
tradeoffs for password guessing [2,13,20,3,19,4], but the game we analyse here requires
no pre-computation done by the attacker.
Our results. We develop a formalism to compare strategies and derive some useful
lemmas. We show that when we can run an infinite number of independent attacks of the
1 CD(1m) can be lower than m since there is a probability to succeed before reaching the mth
step.
2 http://www.di.ens.fr/
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same distribution, an optimal strategy is of the form 1m2m3m · · · and it has complexity
min
m
CD(1m)
PrD(1m)
for some “magic” value m. This justifies the rule of the thumb to compare attacks with
different probabilities of success.
When the probability that an attack succeeds at each new step decreases (e.g., be-
cause we try possible key values in decreasing order of likelihood), there are two re-
markable extreme cases: m = n (where n is the maximal number of steps) corresponds
to the normal single-target exhaustive search with a complexity equal to the guesswork
entropy [17] of the distribution; m = 1 corresponds to trying attacks for a single step
until it works, with complexity 2−H∞ , where H∞ is the min-entropy of the distribution.
When looking at the “magic” value m in terms of the distribution D, we observe
that in many cases there is a phase transition: when D is very close to uniform, we have
m = n. As soon as it becomes slightly biased, we have m = 1. There is no graceful
decrease from m = n to m = 1.
We also treat the case where we have a finite number |D| of independent attacks to
run. We show that there is an optimal “magic” sequence m1,m2, . . . such that an optimal
strategy has form
1m12m1 · · · |D|m1 1m22m2 · · · |D|m2 · · ·
The best strategy is first to run all attacks for m1 steps in a sequence then to continue to
run them for m2 steps in a sequence, and so on.
Although our results look pretty natural, we show that there are distributions making
the analysis counter-intuitive. Proving these results is actually non trivial.
We apply this formalism to LPN by guessing the noise vector then performing a
Gaussian elimination to extract the secret. The optimal m decreases as the probability τ
to have an error in a parity bit decreases from 12 . For τ =
1
2 , the optimal m corresponds
to a normal exhaustive search. For τ < 12 − ln22k , where k is the length of the secret, the
optimal m is 1: this corresponds to guessing that we have no noise at all. So, there is a
phase transition.
Furthermore, for LPN with τ = k− 12 , which is what is used in many cryptographic
constructions, the obtained complexity is poly ·e
√
k which is much better than the usual
poly · 2
k
log2 k that we obtain for variants of the BKW algorithm [6]. More generally, we
obtain a complexity of poly · e−k ln(1−τ). It is not better than the BKW variants for con-
stant τ but becomes interesting when τ < ln2log2 k .
When the number of samples is limited in the LPN problem with τ = k− 12 , we can
still solve it with complexity eO(
√
k(lnk)2) which is better than eO(
k
ln lnk ) with the BKW
variants [16].
For LWE, the phase transition is similar, but the algorithm for m = 1 is not better
than the BKW variants. This is due to the 0 noise having a much lower probability in
LWE (which is 1− τ for LPN) in the discrete Gaussian distribution in Zq.
For password search, we tried several empirical distributions of passwords and ob-
tained again that the optimal m is m = 1. So, the complexity is 2−H∞ .
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Besides the 3 problems we study here, we believe that our results can prove to be
useful in other cryptographic applications.
Structure of the paper. Section 2 formalizes the problem and presents a few useful
results. In Section 3 we characterize the optimal strategies and show they can be given
a special regular structure. We then apply this in Section 4 with LPN and password
recovery. Due to lack of space, we do the same for LWE in the full version of this paper.
We study the phase transition of the ”magic” number m in Section 5 and conclude in
Section 6.
2 The STEP game
In this section we introduce our framework through which we address the fundamental
question of what is the best strategy to succeed in at least one attack when we can step
several independent attacks. Let D = (D1,D2, . . .) be a tuple of independent distribu-
tions. If it is finite, |D| denotes the number of distributions. We formalize our framework
as a game where we have a ppt adversary A and an oracle that has a sequence of keys
(K1,K2, . . .) where Ki ← Di. At the beginning, the oracle assigns the keys according to
their distribution. These distributions are known to the adversary A . The adversary will
test each key Ki by exhaustive search following a given ordering of possible values. We
can assume that values are sorted by decreasing order of likelihood to obtain a minimal
complexity but this is not necessary in our analysis. We only assume a fixed order. So,
our framework generalizes to other types of attacks in which we cannot choose the or-
der of the steps. Each test on Ki corresponds to a step in the exhaustive search for Ki. In
general, we write “i” in a sequence to denote that we run one new step of the ith attack.
The sequence of “i”s defines a strategy s. It can be finite or not. The sequence of steps
we follow is thus a sequence of indices. For instance, im means “run the Ki search for m
steps”. The oracle is an algorithm that has a special command: STEP(i). When queried
with the command STEP(i), the oracle runs one more step of the ith attack ( so, it incre-
ments a counter ti and tests if Ki = ti, assuming that possible key values are numbered
from 1). If this happens then the adversary wins. The adversary wins as soon as one
attack succeeds (i.e., he guesses one of the keys from the sequence K1,K2, . . . ).
Definition 1 (Strategies). Let D be a sequence of distributions D = (D1, . . . ,D|D|)
(where |D| can be infinite or not). A strategy for D is a sequence s of indices between 1
and |D|. It corresponds to Algorithm 1. We let PrD(s) be the probability that the strategy
Algorithm 1 Strategy s in the STEP game
1: initialize attacks 1, . . . , |D|
2: for j = 1 to |s| do
3: STEP(s j): run one more step of the attack s j and stop if succeeded
4: end for
5: stop (the algorithm fails)
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succeeds and CD(s) be the expected number of STEP when running the algorithm until
it stops. We say that the strategy is full if PrD(s) = 1 and that it is partial otherwise.
For example for s = 11223344 · · ·, Algorithm 1 tests the first two values for each key.
Definition 2 (Distributions). A distribution Di over a set of size n is a sequence of
probabilities Di = (p1, . . . , pn) of sum 1 such that p j ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . ,n. We assume
without loss of generality that pn 6= 0 (Otherwise, we decrease n). We can equivalently
specify the distribution Di in an incremental way by a sequence Di = [p′1, . . . , p′n] (de-
noted with square brackets) such that
p′j =
p j
p j + · · ·+ pn p j = p
′
j(1− p′1) · · · (1− p′j−1)
for j = 1, . . . ,n.
We have PrD(i j) = p1 + · · ·+ p j = 1− (1− p′1) · · · (1− p′j), the probability of the j first
values under Di.
When considering the key search, it may be useful to assume that distributions are
sorted by decreasing likelihood. We note that the equivalent condition to p j ≥ p j+1 with
the incremental description is 1p′j + j ≤
1
p′j+1
+ j+ 1, for j = 1, . . . ,n− 1.
We define the distribution that the keys are not among the already tested ones.
Definition 3 (Residual distribution). Let D = (D1, . . . ,D|D|) be a sequence of distri-
butions and let s be a strictly partial strategy for D (i.e., PrD(s) < 1). We denote by
“|¬s” the residual distribution in the case where the strategy s does not succeed, i.e.,
the event ¬s occurs.
We let #occs(i) denote the number of occurrences of i in s. We have
D|¬s =
(
D1|¬1#occs(1), . . . ,D|D||¬|D|#occs(|D|)
)
where Di|¬iti = [p′i,ti+1, . . . , p′i,ni ] if Di = [p′i,1, . . . , p′i,ni ]. Hence, defining distributions
in the incremental way makes the residual distribution being just a shift of the original
one.
We write PrD(s′|¬s) = PrD|¬s(s′) and CD(s′|¬s) =CD|¬s(s′).
Next, we prove a list of useful lemmas in order to compute complexities, compare
strategies, etc.
Lemma 4 (Success probability). Let s be a strategy for D. The success probability is
computed by
Pr
D
(s) = 1−
|D|
∏
i=1
Pr
Di
(¬i#occs(i))
Proof. The failure corresponds to the case where for all i, Ki is not in {1, . . . ,#occs(i)}.
The independence of the Ki implies the result. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 5 (Complexity of concatenated strategies). Let ss′ be a strategy for D ob-
tained by concatenating the sequences s and s′. If PrD(s) = 1, we have PrD(ss′) = PrD(s)
and CD(ss′) =CD(s). Otherwise, we have
Pr
D
(ss′) = Pr
D
(s)+
(
1−Pr
D
(s)
)
Pr
D
(s′|¬s)
CD(ss′) = CD(s)+
(
1−Pr
D
(s)
)
CD(s′|¬s)
Proof. The first equation is trivial from the definition of residual distributions and con-
ditional probabilities.
The prefix strategy s succeeds with probability PrD(s). Let c be the complexity of
s conditioned to the event that s succeeds. Clearly, the complexity of ss′ conditioned
to this event is equal to c. The complexity of ss′ conditioned to the opposite event is
equal to |s|+CD(s′|¬s). So, CD(ss′) = PrD(s)c + (1− PrD(s))(|s|+CD(s′|¬s)). The
complexity of s conditioned to that s fails is equal to |s|. So, CD(s) = PrD(s)c+(1−
PrD(s))|s|. From these two equations, we obtain the result. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6 (Complexity with incremental distributions). Let Di = [p′i,1, . . . , p′i,ni ] and
let s be a strategy for D = (D1,D2, . . .). We have
Pr
D
(s) = 1−
|s|
∏
t′=1
(1− p′st′ ,#occs1···st′ (st′ ))
CD(s) =
|s|
∑
t=1
t−1
∏
t′=1
(1− p′st′ ,#occs1···st′ (st′ ))
Proof. By induction, the probability that the strategy fails on the first t − 1 steps is
qt = ∏t−1t′=1(1− p′st′ ,#occs1···st′ (st′ )). We can express CD(s) = ∑
|s|
t=1 qt . So, we can deduce
PrD(s) and CD(s). ⊓⊔
Example 7. For D1 = (p1, . . . , pn) = [p′1, . . . , p′n] and m≤ n, due to Lemma 6 we have
Pr
D
(1m) = p1 + · · ·+ pm = 1− (1− p′1) · · · (1− p′m)
and
CD(1m) =
m
∑
t=1
t−1
∏
j=1
(1− p′j)
=
m
∑
t=1
(pt + · · ·+ pn) = p1 + 2p2 + · · ·+mpm+mpm+1 + · · ·+mpn
The second equality uses the relations from Definition 2.
We want to concatenate an isomorphic copy w of a strategy v to another strategy u.
For this, we make sure that w and u have no index in common.
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Definition 8 (Disjoint copy of a strategy). Two strategies v and w are isomorphic if
there exists an injective mapping ϕ such that wt = ϕ(vt) for all t and Dϕ(i) = Di for all
i. So, CD(v) =CD(w). Let u and v be two strategies for D. Whenever possible, we define
a new strategy w = newu(v) such that v and w are isomorphic and w has no index in
common with u.
We can define it by recursion: if w1 = ϕ(v1), . . . ,wt−1 = ϕ(vt−1) are already defined
and ϕ(vt) is not, we set it to the smallest index i (if exists) which does not appear in u
nor in w1, . . . ,wt−1 and such that Di = Dvt .
For instance, if v = 1m, all Di are equal, and i is the minimal index which does not
appear in u, we have newu(v) = im.
Lemma 9 (Complexity of a repetition of disjoint copies). Let s be a non-empty strat-
egy for D. We define new strategies s+1,s+2, . . ., disjoint copies of s, by recursion as fol-
lows: s+r = newss+1···s+(r−1)(s). We assume that s+1,s+2, . . . ,s+(r−1) can be constructed.
If PrD(s) = 0, then
CD(ss+1s+2 · · ·s+(r−1)) = r ·CD(s).
Otherwise, we have
CD(ss+1s+2 · · · s+(r−1)) =
1− (1−PrD(s))r
PrD(s)
CD(s)
For r going to ∞, we respectively obtain CD(ss+1s+2 · · ·) = +∞ and
CD(ss+1s+2 · · · ) = CD(s)PrD(s)
For instance, for s = 1m and Di all equal, the disjoint isomorphic copies of s are s+r =
(1+ r)m. I.e., we run m steps the (1+ r)th attack. So, ss+1s+2 · · · s+(r−1) = 1m2m · · · rm.
Proof. We prove it by induction on r. This is trivial for r = 1. Let s¯r = ss+1s+2 · · · s+r.
If it is true for r− 2, then
CD(s¯r−1) = CD(s¯r−2)+ (1−Pr
D
(s¯r−2))CD(s+(r−1)|¬s¯r−2)
=
{
1−(1−PrD(s))r−1
PrD(s)
CD(s)+ (1−PrD(s¯r−2))CD(s+(r−1)|¬s¯r−2) if PrS(s)> 0
(r− 1) ·CD(s)+ (1−PrD(s¯r−2))CD(s+(r−1)|¬s¯r−2) if PrS(s) = 0
Clearly, we have 1−PrD(s¯r−2) = (1−PrD(s))r−1 and CD(s+(r−1)|¬s¯r−2) =CD(s). So,
we obtain the result. ⊓⊔
Example 10. For all Di equal, if we let s = 1m, we can compute
CD(1m2m · · · rm) = 1− (1−PrD(1
m))r
PrD(1m)
CD(1m)
=
1− (pm+1+ · · ·+ pn)r
p1 + · · ·+ pm (p1 + 2p2 + · · ·+mpm+mpm+1 + · · ·+mpn)
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We now consider r = ∞. For an infinite number of i.i.d distributions we have
CD(1m2m · · ·) = CD(1
m)
PrD(1m)
=
p1 + 2p2 + · · ·+mpm +mpm+1 + · · · ,mpn
p1 + · · ·+ pm
=
∑mi=1 ipi +m(1− p1+ · · ·+ pm)
p1 + · · ·+ pm
= Gm +m
(
1
PrDi(1m)
− 1
)
where Gm =CD1|1m(1
m) and D1|1m = ( p1PrD1 (1m) , . . . ,
pm
PrD1 (1
m)). If D1 is ordered, Gm cor-
responds to the guesswork entropy of the key with distribution D1|1m.
We can see two extreme cases for s = 1m2m · · · . On one end we have a strategy of
exhaustively searching the key until it is found, i.e. take m = n. On the other extreme we
have a strategy where the adversary tests just one key before switching to another key,
i.e. m = 1. For the sequences s = 12 · · · and s = 1n2n · · · , i.e. m = 1 and m = n, when
D1 is ordered by decreasing likelihood, we obtain the following expected complexity:
m = 1⇒ CD(12 · · ·) = 1p1 = 2
−H∞(D1)
m = n⇒ CD(1n2n · · · ) =CD(1n) = Gn,
where H∞(D1) and Gn denote the min-entropy and the guesswork entropy of the distri-
bution D1, respectively.
We now define a way to compare partial strategies.
Definition 11 (Strategy comparison). We define
minCD(s) = inf
s′;PrD(ss′)=1
CD(ss′)
the infimum of CD(ss′), i.e. the greatest of its lower bounds. We write s≤D s′ if and only
if minCD(s) ≤minCD(s′). A strategy s is optimal if minCD(s) =minCD( /0), where /0 is
the empty strategy (i.e. the strategy running no step at all).
So, s is better than s′ if we can reach lower complexities by starting with s instead of s′.
The partial strategy s is optimal if we can still reach the optimal complexity when we
start by s.
Lemma 12 (Best prefixes are best strategies). If u and v are permutations of each
other, we have u≤D v if and only if CD(u)≤CD(v).
Proof. Note that PrD(u) = 1 is equivalent to PrD(v) = 1. If PrD(u) = 1, it holds that
minCD(u) = CD(u) and minCD(v) = CD(v). So, the result is trivial in this case. Let us
now assume that PrD(u)< 1 and PrD(v)< 1. For any s′, by using Lemma 5 we have
CD(us′) =CD(u)+
(
1−Pr
D
(u)
)
CD(s′|¬u)
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So,
inf
s′;PrD(us′)=1
CD(us′) =CD(u)+
(
1−Pr
D
(u)
)
inf
s′;PrD(us′)=1
CD(s′|¬u)
The same holds for v. Since u and v are permutations of each other, we have D|¬u =
D|¬v. So, PrD(us′) = PrD(vs′) and CD(s′|¬u) = CD(s′|¬v). Hence, infCD(s′|¬u) =
infCD(s′|¬v). Furthermore, we have PrD(u) = PrD(v). So, minCD(u) ≤ minCD(v) is
equivalent to CD(u)≤CD(v). ⊓⊔
3 Optimal strategy
The question we address in this paper is: what is the optimal strategy for the adversary
so that he obtains the best complexity in our STEP formalism? That is, we try to find
the optimal sequence s for Algorithm 1. At a first glance, we may think that a greedy
strategy always making a step which is the most likely to succeed is an optimal strategy.
We show below that this is wrong. Sometimes, it is better to run a series of unlikely steps
in one given attack because we can then run a much more likely one of the same attack
after these steps are complete. However, criteria to find this strategy are not trivial at all.
The greedy algorithm is based on looking at the i for which the next applicable p′j
in Di is the largest. With our formalism, this defines as follows.
Definition 13 (Greedy strategy). Let s be a strategy for D. We say that s is greedy if
Pr
D
(st |¬s1 · · · st−1) = max
i
Pr
D
(i|¬s1 · · · st−1)
for t = 1, . . . , |s|.
The following example shows that the greedy strategy is not always optimal.
Example 14. We take |D| = ∞ and all Di equal to Di = ( 23 , 736 , 536 ) = [ 23 , 712 ,1]. Af-
ter testing the first key, we have D|¬1 = (D′,D2,D3, . . .) with D′ = ( 712 , 512) = [ 712 ,1].
Since 23 >
7
12 , the greedy algorithm would then test a new key and continue testing new
keys. I.e., we would have s = 1234 · · · as a greedy strategy. By applying Lemma 5, the
complexity is solution to c = 1+ 13 c, i.e., c =
3
2 . However, the one-key strategy s = 111
has complexity
2
3 + 2
7
36 + 3
5
36 =
53
36 <
3
2
so the greedy strategy is not the best one.
Remark: The above counterexample works even when |D| is finite. If we take D =
(D1,D2) with Di = ( 23 ,
7
36 ,
5
36 ) = [
2
3 ,
7
12 ,1], the greedy approach would test the strategy
s = 1211 that has a complexity of
1+ 13
(
1+ 13
(
1+ 5
12
·1
))
=
161
108 .
This is greater than 5336 , the complexity of the strategy 111.
Next, we note that we may have no optimal strategy as the following example shows.
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Example 15 (Distribution with no optimal strategy). Let qi be an increasing sequence
of probabilities which tends towards 1 without reaching it. Let Di = [qi,qi, . . . ,qi,1] of
support n. We have C(in) = 1qi (1− (1−qi)n) which tends towards 1 as i grows. So, 1 is
the best lower bound of the complexity of full strategies. But there is no full strategy of
complexity 1.
When the number of different distributions is finite, optimal strategies exist.
Lemma 16 (Existence of an optimal full strategy). Let D = (D1,D2, . . .) be a se-
quence of distributions. We assume that we have in D a finite number of different distri-
butions. There exists a full strategy s such that CD(s) is minimal.
Proof. Clearly, c = infCD(s) over all full strategies s is well defined. Essentially, we
want to prove that c is reached by one strategy, i.e. that the infimum is a minimum.
First, if c = ∞, all full strategies have infinite complexity, and the result is trivial. So,
we now assume that c <+∞ and we prove the result by a diagonal argument.
We now construct s = s1s2 · · · by recursion. We assume that s1s2 · · · sr is constructed
such that minC(s1s2 · · · sr) = c. We concatenate s1, . . . ,sr to im where m is such that
PrD[im−1|¬s1 · · · sr] = 0 and PrD[im|¬s1 · · ·sr] > 0. The values of i to try are the ones
such that i appears in s1, . . . ,sr (we have a finite number of them), and the ones which do
not appear, but we can try only one for each different Di. We take the choice minimizing
minC(s1s2 · · ·srim) and set sr+1 = im. So, we construct a strategy s.
If one key Ki is tested until exhaustion, we have PrD(s) = 1. If no key is tested
until exhaustion, there is an infinite number of keys with same distribution Di which are
tested. If p = PrD[im] is the nonzero probability with the smallest m of this distribution,
there is an infinite number of tests which succeed with probability p. So, PrD(s) ≥
1− (1− p)∞ = 1. In all cases, as s has a probability to succeed of 1, s is a full strategy.
What remains to be proven is that CD(s) = c. We now denote by si the ith step of s.
Let qt be the probability that s fails on the first t − 1 steps. We have CD(s) =
∑|s|t=1 qt . Let ε > 0. For each r, by construction, there exists a tail strategy v such that
CD(s1 · · · sr−1v)≤ c+ ε. Since qt is also the probability that s1 · · ·sr−1v fails on the first
t−1 steps for t ≤ r, we have ∑rt=1 qt ≤CD(s1 · · · sr−1v)≤ c+ ε. This holds for all r. So,
we have CD(s)≤ c+ε. Since this holds for all ε > 0, we have CD(s)≤ c. Consequently,
CD(s) = c: s is an optimal and full strategy. ⊓⊔
The following two results show what is the structure of an optimal strategy.
Theorem 17. Let D = (D1,D2, . . .) be a sequence of distributions. We assume that we
have in D a finite number of pairwise different distributions but an infinite number of
copies of each of them in D. There exists a sequence of indices i1 < i2 < · · · and an
integer m such that Di1 =Di2 = · · · and s = im1 im2 · · · is an optimal strategy of complexity
CD(im1 )
PrD(im1 )
.
Here are examples of optimal m for different distributions.
Example 18 (Uniform distribution). For the uniform distribution pi = 1n , with 1≤ i≤ n.
We get PrD(1m) = mn and Gm =
m+1
2 . With this we obtain CD(1
m2m · · · ) = n− m−12 .
Thus, the value of m that minimizes the complexity is m = n and CD(1m2m · · ·) = n−12 .
The best strategy is to exhaustively search the key until it is found.
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Example 19 (Geometric distribution). For the geometric distribution with parameter p,
we have pi = (1− p)i−1 p, with i = 1,2, . . . or Di = [p, p, . . .]. Due to Lemma 5, we can
see that for every infinite strategy s, CD(s) = 1p .
In Appendix A we study concatenations of uniform distributions.
We note that Th. 17 does not extend if some distribution has a finite number of
copies as the following example shows.
Example 20 (Distribution with no optimal strategy of the form im1 im2 · · · ). Let D1 = [1−
ε,ε,ε, . . . ,ε,1] of support n and D2 = D3 = · · ·= [p, . . . , p,1] for ε < p≤ 12 and n large
enough. Given a full strategy s, the formula in Lemma 5 defines a sequence qt(s) =
p′
st ,#occs1···st (st)
. We can see that for all full strategies s and s′, if |s| ≤ |s′| and qt(s)≥ qt(s′)
for t = 1, . . . , |s|, then CD(s) ≤CD(s′). With this, we can see that s = 12n is better than
all full strategies with length at least n + 1. There are only two full strategies with
smaller length: 1n and 2n. We have CD(2n) = 1−(1−p)
n
p ≈ 1p ≥ 2 as n grows. We have
CD(12n) = 1+ ε 1−(1−p)
n
p ≈ 1+ εp as n grows, so CD(12n)<CD(2n) for n large enough.
We have CD(1n) = 1+ ε 1−(1−ε)
n−1
ε = 2− (1− ε)n−1 ≈ 2 so CD(12n) < CD(1n) for n
large enough. For all strategies of length at least n+ 1, s = 12n collected the largest
possible p′ values. So, the best strategy is s = 12n. It is better than any strategy of form
im1 im2 · · · .
When we have a finite number of distributions, we may have no optimal strategy
of the form in Th. 17. We may have multiple layers of repetition of im as the following
result shows.
Theorem 21. Let D1 be a distribution of finite support n. Let D = (D1,D2, . . . ,D|D|) be
a finite sequence of length |D| in which D1 = D2 = · · ·= D|D|. There exists a sequence
m1, . . . ,mr such that the strategy
s = 1m12m1 · · · |D|m1 1m22m2 · · · |D|m2 · · ·1mr
is optimal.
We provide toy examples below.
Example 22. We take D = (D1,D2) with D1 = D2 = ( 35 ,
9
25 ,
1
50 ,
1
50 ) = [
3
5 ,
18
20 ,
1
2 ,1]. Here
are the complexities of some full strategies.
CD(1111) =
146
100 = 1.46
CD(12111) =
792
500 = 1.584
CD(11211) =
732
500 = 1.464
CD(121211) =
7892
5000 = 1.5784
CD(112211) =
7292
5000 = 1.4584
so the last strategy is the best one. Notice that this is also a greedy strategy.
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Example 23. We take D = (D1,D2) with D1 = D2 = ( 70100 ,
20
100 ,
5
100 ,
3
100 ,
1
100 ,
1
100) =
[ 70100 ,
2
3 ,
1
2 ,
3
5 ,
1
2 ,1]. Here are the complexities of some full strategies.
CD(111111) = 1.48
CD(1211111) = 1.44
CD(12121111) = 1.438
CD(121212111) = 1.439
CD(121122111) = 1.444
so s = 12121111 is the best one. For this example we have that the optimal strategy
requires m1 = 1, m2 = 1 and m3 = 4. It is also greedy.
3.1 Proof of Th. 17
To prove the result, we first state a useful lemma.
Lemma 24 (Is it better to do s or s′ first?). If s and s′ are non-empty and have no index
in common (i.e., if st 6= s′t′ for all t and t ′), then ss′ ≤D s′s if and only if CD(s)PrD(s) ≤
CD(s′)
PrD(s′)
in [0,+∞], with the convension that cp =+∞ for c > 0 and p = 0.
Proof. Due to Lemma 5, when PrD(s)< 1 we have
CD(ss′) =CD(s)+
(
1−Pr
D
(s)
)
CD(s′|¬s)
Since s′ does not make use of the distributions which are dropped in D|¬s, we have
CD(s′|¬s) =CD(s′). So,
CD(ss′) =CD(s)+
(
1−Pr
D
(s)
)
CD(s′)
This is also clearly the case when PrD(s) = 1. Similarly,
CD(s′s) =CD(s′)+
(
1−Pr
D
(s′)
)
CD(s)
So, CD(ss′)≤CD(s′s) is equivalent to
CD(s)+
(
1−Pr
D
(s)
)
CD(s′)≤CD(s′)+
(
1−Pr
D
(s′)
)
CD(s)
So, this inequality is equivalent to CD(s)PrD(s) ≤
CD(s′)
PrD(s′) . ⊓⊔
We can now prove Th. 17.
Proof (of Th. 17). Due to Lemma 16, we know that optimal full strategies exist. Let s be
one of these. We let i be the index of an arbitrary key which is tested in s. We can write
s = u0im1u1im2 · · · imr ur where i appears in no u j and m j > 0 for all j, and u1, . . . ,ur−1
are non-empty.
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Since s is optimal, by permuting im j and either u j−1 or u j, we obtain larger com-
plexities. So, by applying Lemma 24, we obtain
CD(im1)
PrD(im1)
≤ CD(u1|¬u0)
PrD(u1|¬u0) ≤
CD(im2 |¬im1)
PrD(im1 |¬im1) ≤ ·· · ≤CD(ur|¬u0 · · ·ur−1)
We now want to replace ur in s by some isomorphic copy of s which is not overlap-
ping with u0im1 u1im2 · · · imr . Due to the optimality of s, we would deduce
CD(ur|¬u0 · · ·ur−1)≤CD(s|¬u0 · · ·ur−1) =CD(s)
so
CD(im1 )
PrD(im1 )
≤CD(s) which would imply that the repetition of isomorphic copies of im1
are at least as good as s, so CD(i
m1 )
PrD(im1 )
= CD(s) due to the optimality of s. But to replace
ur in s by the isomorphic copy of s, we need to rewrite the original s containing ur by
some isomorphic copy in which indices are left free to implement another isomorphic
copy of s.
For that, we split the sequence (1,2,3, . . .) into two subsequences v and v′ which
are non-overlapping (i.e. vt 6= vt′ for all t and t ′), complete (i.e. for every integer j, v
contains j or v′ contains j), and representing each distribution with infinite number of
occurrences (i.e. for all j, there exist infinite sequences t1 < t2 < · · · and t ′1 < t ′2 < · · ·
such that D j = Dvtℓ = Dv′t′
ℓ
for all ℓ). For that, we can just construct v and v′ iteratively:
for each j, if the number of j′ < j such that D j′ =D j in v or v′ is the same, we put j in v,
otherwise (we may have only one more instance in v), we put j in v′ (to balance again).
For instance, if all Di are equal, this construction puts all odd j in v and all even j in v′.
Hence, we can define s′ = newv(s) and s′′ = newv′(s). s′ will thus only use indices in
v′ while s′′ will only use indices in v. Therefore, s′ and s′′ will be isomorphic, with no
index in common. So, CD(s) =CD(s′) =CD(s′′).
Following the split of s, the strategy s′ can be written s′ = u′0i′
m1 u′1i′
m2 · · · i′mr u′r with
CD(im1)
PrD(im1)
=
CD(i′m1)
PrD(i′m1)
≤CD(u′r|¬u′0 · · ·u′r−1) =CD(u′r|¬u′0i′m1u′1i′m2 · · · i′mr )
If we replace u′r in s′ by s′′, since s′ is optimal, we obtain a larger complexity. So,
CD(u′0i′
m1u′1i′
m2 · · · i′mr u′r)≤CD(u′0i′m1 u′1i′m2 · · · i′mr s′′)
These two strategies have the prefix u′0i′
m1 u′1i′
m2 · · · i′mr in common. We can write their
complexities by splitting this common prefix using Lemma 5. By eliminating the com-
mon terms, we deduce
CD(u′r|¬u′0i′m1u′1i′m2 · · · i′mr)≤CD(s′′|¬u′0i′m1 u′1i′m2 · · · i′mr) =CD(s′′) =CD(s)
We deduce
CD(im1)
PrD(im1)
≤CD(s)
Let i1 < i2 < · · · be a sequence of keys using the distribution Di. By Lemma 9, the
strategy im1 im2 · · · has complexity CD(i
m1 )
PrD(im1 )
. Since s is optimal, we have CD(i
m1 )
PrD(im1 )
≥CD(s).
Therefore, CD(i
m1 )
PrD(im1 )
=CD(s). ⊓⊔
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3.2 Proof of Th. 21
For the proof of Theorem 21 we need the result of the following lemma.
Lemma 25. Let s = uiav jbw be an optimal strategy with n occurrences of each key. We
assume that i 6= j, a < b, u does not end with i, v has no occurrence of either i or j,
and w has equal number of occurrences for i and j. Furthermore, we assume that either
a 6= 0, or v is nonempty and starts with some k such that u does not end with k. Then,
CD(s) =CD(u jb−aiav jaw).
Lemma 25 will be used in two ways.
1. For s = u′ jcv jbw with c > 0, b > 0, v with no i or j, and balanced occurrences
of i and j in w, which has the same complexity as s′ = u′ jb+cvw (so, to apply the
lemma we define a = 0, u = u′ jc, k = j, and s = u′ jci0v jbw; all hypotheses are
verified except v non-empty, but the result is trivial for empty v). This means that
we can regroup jc and jb when there are separated by a v with no i and followed by
a balanced tail w.
2. For s = uiav jbw with 0 < a < b, v with no i or j, and balanced occurrences of i and
j in w, which has the same complexity as s′ = u jb−aiav jaw. This means that we can
balance ia and jb when there are separated by a v with no i or j and followed by a
balanced tail w.
The proof of Lemma 25 is given in Appendix B.
In what follows, we say that a strategy is in a normal form if for all t, i 7→ #occs1···st (i)
is a non-increasing function, i.e. #occs1···st (i) ≥ #occs1···st (i+ 1) for all i. For instance,
1112322133 is normal as the number of STEP(1) is at no time lower than the number
of STEP(2) and the same for the number of STEP(2) and STEP(3).
Since all distributions are the same, all strategies can be rewritten into an equiv-
alent one in a normal form: for this, for the smallest t such that there exists i such
that #occs1···st (i) < #occs1···st (i + 1), it must be that st = i + 1 and #occs1···st−1(i) =
#occs1···st−1(i+1). We can permute all values i and i+1 in the tail st st+1 · · · and obtain
an equivalent strategy on which the function becomes non-increasing at step t and is
unchanged before. By performing enough such rewriting, we obtain an equivalent strat-
egy in normal form. For instance, 12231332 is not normal. The smallest t is t = 3 when
we make a second STEP(2) while we only did a single STEP(1). So, we permute 1 and
2 at this time and obtain 12132331. Then, we have t = 7 and permute 2 and 3 to obtain
12132321. Then, again t = 7 to permute 1 and 2 to obtain 12132312 which is normal.
We now prove Th. 21.
Proof (of Th. 21). Let s be an optimal strategy. Due to the assumptions, it must be finite.
We assume w.l.o.g. that s is in normal form. We note that we can always complete s in a
form s2a23a3 · · · so that the final strategy has exactly n occurrences of each i. So, we as-
sume w.l.o.g. that s has equal number of occurrences. We write s = 1m1x11m2x2 · · ·1mr xr
where the xt ’s are non-empty and with no 1 inside.
As detailed below, we rewrite xr (and push some steps earlier in xr−1) so that we
obtain a permutation of the blocks 2mr , . . . , |D|mr . The rewriting is done by preserving
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the probability of success (which is 1) and the complexity (which is the optimal com-
plexity). Then, we do the same operation in xr−1 and continue until x1. When we are
done, each xt becomes a permutation of the blocks 2mt , . . . , |D|mt . Finally, we normalize
the obtained rewriting of s and obtain the result.
We assume that s has already been rewritten so that for each t ′ = t + 1, . . . ,r, the
xt′ sub-strategy is a permutation of the blocks 2mt′ , . . . , |D|mt′ . Then, we explain how
to rewrite xt . We make a loop for j = 2 to |D|. In the loop, we first regroup all blocks
of j’s by using Lemma 25 with i = 1: while we can write xt = u′ jcv jbw′ where c > 0,
b > 0, v is non-empty with no j, and w′ has no j, we write u = 1m1x11m2x2 · · ·1mt u′
and w = w′1mt+1xt+1 · · ·1mr xr, and set a = 0 and i = 1. This rewrites xt = u′ jb+cvw′ by
preserving the complexity and making a permutation. When this while loop is com-
plete, we can only find a single block of j’s in xt and write xt = v jbw′, where v and
w′ have no j. So, we apply again Lemma 25 to balance 1mt and jb: we write u =
1m1x11m2x2 · · ·xt−1 and w=w′1mt+1xt+1 · · ·1mr xr, and set a=mt and i= 1. This rewrites
1mt xt to jb−mt 1mt v jmt w′ by preserving the complexity and making a permutation. So,
this rewrites xt to v jmt w′ and xt−1 to xt−1 jb−mt . When the loop of j is complete, xt is a
permutation of the blocks 2mt , . . . , |D|mt .
Interestingly, the sequence m1, . . . ,mr is unchanged from our starting optimal nor-
mal full strategy s. If we rather start from an optimal full strategy s which is not in
normal form, we can still see how to obtain this sequence: for each t, m1 + · · ·+mt is
the next record number of steps for an attack i after the m1 + · · ·+mt−1 record. That is
the number of steps for the attack i when s decides to move to another attack. ⊓⊔
3.3 Finding the optimal m
We provide here a simple criterion for the optimal m of Th. 17.
Lemma 26. We let D1 = (p1, . . . , pn) = [p′1, . . . , p′n] be a distribution and define D =
(D1,D1, . . .). Let m be such that s = 1m2m · · · is an optimal strategy based on Th. 17.
We have 1p′m ≤CD(1
m2m · · ·)≤ 1p′m+1 .
Proof. We let s = 2m3m · · · We know that CD(1m+1s) ≥CD(1ms) since 1ms is optimal.
So,
0 ≤ CD(1m+1s)−CD(1ms)
= (1−Pr
D
(1m))(CD(1s|¬1m)−CD(s))
= (1−Pr
D
(1m))(1− p′m+1 ·CD(s))
from which we deduce 1p′m+1 ≥CD(s). Similarly, we have
0 ≥ CD(1ms)−CD(1m−1s)
= (1−Pr
D
(1m−1))(CD(1s|¬1m−1)−CD(s))
= (1−Pr
D
(1m−1))(1− p′m ·CD(s))
from which we deduce 1p′m ≤CD(s). ⊓⊔
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We note that if pm = pm+1, then
p′m+1 =
pm+1
pm+1 + · · ·+ pn =
pm
pm+1 + · · ·+ pn >
pm
pm + pm+1 + · · ·+ pn = p
′
m
which is impossible (given the result from Lemma 26). Consequently, we must have
pm 6= pm+1. So, in distributions when we have sequences of equal probabilities pt , we
can just look at the largest index t in the sequence as a possible candidate for being the
value m.
Lemma 26 has an equivalent for Th. 21 (given in the full version of this paper due
to lack of space).
4 Applications
4.1 Solving sparse LPN
We will model the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem in our STEP game. As
we will see, we use the noise bits as the keys the adversary A is trying to guess. First of
all, we formally give the definition of the LPN problem.
Definition 27 (Search LPN). Let s U←− Zk2, let τ ∈]0, 12 [ be a constant noise parameter
and let Berτ be the Bernoulli distribution with parameter τ. Denote by Ds,τ the distri-
bution defined as
{(v,c) | v U←− Zk2,c = 〈v,s〉⊕ d,d ← Berτ} ∈ Zk+12 .
An LPN oracle OLPNs,τ is an oracle which outputs independent random samples accord-
ing to Ds,τ.
Given queries from the oracle OLPNs,τ , the search LPN problem is to find the secret s.
As studied in [6], the LPN-solving algorithms which are based on BKW [5] have a
complexity poly ·2
k
log2 k . The naive algorithm guessing that the noise is 0 and running a
Gaussian elimination until this finds the correct solution works with complexity poly ·
(1−τ)−k. So, the latter is much better as soon as τ < ln2log2 k , and in particular for τ = k
− 12
which is the case for some applications [1,9]. Experiments reported in [6] also show that
for τ = k− 12 , the Gaussian elimination outperforms the BKW variants for k > 500.
The Gaussian elimination algorithm just reduces to finding a k-bit noise vector. It
guesses that this vector is 0. If this does not work, the algorithm tries again with new
LPN queries. We can see this as guessing at least one k-bit biased vector Ki which
follows the distribution Di = Berkτ defined by Pr[Ki = v] = τHW(v)(1− τ)k−HW(v) in
our framework. The most probable vector is v = 0 which has probability Pr[Ki = 0] =
(1− τ)k. The above algorithm corresponds to trying K1 = 0 then K2 = 0, ... i.e., the
strategy 123 · · · in our framework. We can wonder if there is a better 1m2m3m · · · . This
is the problem we study below. We will see that the answer is no: using m = 1 is the
best option as soon as τ is less than 12 − ε for ε = ln22k which is pretty small.
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For instance, for LPN768, 1√
768
we obtain CD(12 · · ·) = 241. I.e., 241 calls to the STEP
command which corresponds to collecting k LPN queries and making a Gaussian elim-
ination to recover the secret based on the assumption that the error bits are all 0. If
we add up the cost of running Gaussian elimination in order to recover the secret, we
obtain a complexity of 270. This outperforms all the BKW variants and proves that
LPN768, 1√
768
is not a secure instance for a 80-bit security. Furthermore, this algorithm
outperforms even the covering code algorithm [12]. Our results are strengthened by the
results from [6] where we see that there is a big difference between the performance of
CD(12 · · ·) and the one of the covering code algorithm.
Di is a composite distribution of uniform ones in the sense defined in Appendix A.
Namely, Di = ∑kw=0 τk(1− τ)k−wUw where Uw is uniform of support
(
k
w
)
. By Theo-
rem 17, we know that there exists a magic m for which the strategy s = 1m2m · · · is
optimal. The analysis of composite distributions further says that m must be of form
m = Bw = ∑wi=0
(
k
i
)
for some magic w. Let cm be the complexity of 1m2m · · · . A value
w = k, i.e. m = n corresponds to the exhaustive search of the noise bits. For w = 0, i.e.
m = 1, the adversary assumes that the noise is 0 every time he receives k queries from
the LPN oracle.
We first computed experimentally the optimal m for the LPN100,τ instance where we
take 0 < τ < 12 . The magic m takes the value 1 for a τ which is not close to
1
2 . As shown
on Fig. 1, it changes to n = 2100 around the value τ = 0.4965. This boundary between
two different strategies corresponds to the value τ = 12 − ln22k computed in our analysis
below. Interestingly, there is no intermediate optimal m between 1 and n.
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Fig. 1: The change of optimal m for solving LPN100,τ
For cryptographic parameters, c1 is optimal. The optimal w depends on τ. The case
when τ is lower than 1k is not interesting as it is likely that no error occurs so all w lead
to a complexity which is very close to 1. Conversely, for τ = 12 , the exhaustive search
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has a complexity of cn = 12 (2
k + 1) and w = 0 has a complexity of c1 = 2k. Actually,
Di is uniform in this case and we know that the optimal m completes batches of equal
consecutive probabilities. So, the optimal strategy is the exhaustive search.
We now show that for τ < 0.16, the best strategy is obtained for w = 0.
Below, we use pBw = τw(1− τ)k−w and c1 = (1− τ)−k.
Let wc be a threshold weight and let α= Pr(1Bwc ). For 0<w≤wc, due to Lemma 26,
if cBw is optimal we have
cBw ≥
1
p′Bw
=
PrD(¬1Bw−1)
pBw
≥ PrD(¬1
Bwc )
pBw
=
1−α
pBw
=
1−α(
τ
1−τ
)w c1 ≥ 1−ατ
1−τ
c1
For τ < 0.16, we have τ1−τ < 0.20. So, if α ≤ 45 we obtain cBw > c1. This contradicts
that w is optimal. For wc = τk, the Central Limit Theorem gives us that α≈ 12 which is
less than 45 . So, no w such that 0 < w≤ τk is optimal.
Now, for w≥ wc, we have
cw =
CD(1Bw)
PrD(1Bw)
≥CD(1Bw) =
Bw∑
i=1
ipi +Bw Pr
D
(¬1Bw)≥ Bwc PrD (¬1
Bwc ) = (1−α)Bwc
By using the bound Bwc ≥
(
k
wc
)wc
, for wc = τk we have α ≈ 12 and we obtain cw ≥
1
2 τ
−τk
. We want to compare this to c1 = (1− τ)−k. We look at the variations of the
function τ 7→ −kτ lnτ− ln 2+ k ln(1− τ). We can see by derivating twice that for τ ∈
[0, 12 ], this function increases then decreases. For τ = 0.16, it is positive. For τ =
1
k , it is
also positive. So, for τ ∈ [ 1k ,0.16], we have cBw ≥ c1.
Therefore, for all τ < 0.16, c1 is the best complexity so m = 0 is the magic value.
Experiment shows that this remains true for all τ < 12 − ln22k . Actually, we can easily see
that c1 becomes lower than 2
k+1
2 for τ≈ 12 − ln22k . We will discuss this in Section 5.
Solving LPN with O(k) queries. We now concentrate on the m = n case to limit
the query complexity to O(k). (In our framework, we need only k queries but we
would practically need more to check that we did find the correct value.) So, we es-
timate the complexity of the full exhaustive search on one error vector x of k bits for
LPN, i.e., CD(1n). If pt is the probability that x is the t-th enumerated vector, we have
CD(1n) = ∑nt=1 t pt . For t between Bw−1 + 1 and Bw, the sum of the pt ’s is the probabil-
ity that we have exactly w errors. So, CD(1n)≤ ∑kw=0 Bw Pr[w errors]. We approximate
Pr[w errors] to the continuous distribution. So, the Hamming weight has a normal dis-
tribution, with mean kτ and standard deviation σ =
√
kτ(1− τ). We do the same for
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Bw ≈ 2k√2pi
∫ 2w−k√k
−∞ e−
v2
2 dv. With the change of variables w = kτ+ tσ, we have
CD(1n) ≤
k
∑
w=0
Bw Pr[w errors]
≈ 2
k
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(∫ 2w−k√
k
−∞
e−
v2
2 dv
)
1
σ
e
− (w−kτ)2
2σ2 dw
=
2k
2pi
∫∫
v≤ 2kτ−k+2tσ√k
e−
t2+v2
2 dv dt
The distance between the origin (t,v) = (0,0) and the line v = 2kτ−k+2tσ√k is
d =
√
k 1− 2τ√
1+ 4τ(1− τ)
By rotating the region on which we sum, we obtain
CD(1n)≈ 2
k
2pi
∫∫
x≥d
e−
x2+y2
2 dx dy = 2
k
√
2pi
∫ +∞
d
e−
x2
2 dx∼ 2
k
d
√
2pi
e−
d2
2
On Fig. 2 we can see that this approximation of CD(1n) is very good for τ = k−
1
2 .
So, the complexity CD(1n) is asymptotically 2k(1−
1
2 ln2 )+O(
√
k)
. Interestingly, the
dominant part of log2 CD(1n) is 0.2788× k and does not depend on τ as long as 1k ≪
τ≪ 12 . Although very good for the low k that we consider, this approximation of CD(1n)
deviates, probably because of the imprecise approximation of the Bw’s. Next, we de-
rive a bound which is much higher but asymptotically better (the curves crossing for
k ≈ 50 000). We now use the bound Bw ≤ kw and do the same computation as before.
We have
CD(1n) ≤
k
∑
w=0
kw Pr[w errors]
≈ 1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
kkτ+tσe−
t2
2 dw
=
e
1
2 (σ lnk)
2+kτ lnk
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
(t−σ lnk)2
2 dw
= e
1
2 (σ lnk)
2+kτ lnk
So, CD(1n) = e
1
2
√
k(lnk)2+O(
√
k lnk) for τ = k− 12 . It is better than the eO(
k
ln lnk ) of Lyuba-
shevsky [16] in the sense that it is asymptotically better and that we use O(k) queries
instead of k1+ε. However, this new bound for CD(1n) is very loose.
Outside the scenario of a sparse LPN, we display in Figure 3 the logarithmic com-
plexity to solve LPN in our STEP game when the noise parameter is constant.
Comparing log2(CD(1n)) with the approximation we obtained, i.e. log2
(
2k
d
√
2pi e
− d22
)
,
we obtain the following results which validate our approximations (See Table 1).
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Fig. 2: log2(CD(1n)) vs. log2
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for τ = k− 12
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Fig. 3: log2(CD(1n)) for constant τ
τ log2(CD(1n)) log2
(
2k
d
√
2pi e
− d22
)
0.1 1350.04 1314.81
0.125 1458.86 1429.33
0.25 1794.57 1788.49
0.4 1966.67 1966.55
Table 1: log2(CD(1n)) vs. log2
(
2k
d
√
2pi e
− d22
)
for k = 2000
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4.2 Password recovery
There are many news nowadays with attacks and leaks of passwords from different
famous companies. From these leaks the community has studied what are the worst
passwords used by the users. Having in mind these statistics, we are interested to see
what is the best strategy of an outsider that tries to get access to a system having access
to a list of users. The goal of the attacker is to hack one account. He can try to hack sev-
eral accounts in parallel. Within our framework, we compute to see what is the optimal
m for the strategy 1m2m · · · . In this given scenario, the strategy corresponds to making
m guesses for each user until it reaches the end of the list and starting again with new
guesses.
We consider the statistics that we have found for the 10000 Top Passwords3 and
the one done for the database with passwords in clear from the RockYou hack4. Studies
on the distribution of user’s passwords were also done in [10,23,7,22]. The first case-
study analyses what are the top 10000 passwords from a total 6.5 million username-
passwords leaked. The most frequent passwords are the following:
password p1 = 0.00493
123456 p2 = 0.00400
12345678 p3 = 0.00133
1234 p4 = 0.00089
In the case of the RockYou hack, where 32 million of passwords were leaked, we
have that the most frequent passwords and their probability of usage is:
123456 p1 = 0.009085
12345 p2 = 0.002471
123456789 p3 = 0.002400
Password p4 = 0.000194
Moreover, approximately 20% of the users used the most frequent 5000 passwords.
What these statistics show is that users frequently choose poor and predictable pass-
words. While dictionary attacks are very efficient, we study here the case where the
attacker wants to minimize the number of trials until he gets access to the system, with
no pre-computation done. By using our formulas of computing CD(1m2m · · · ), we ob-
tain in both of the above distributions that m = 1 is the optimal one. This means that
the attacker tries for each username the most probable password and in average after
couple of hundred of users (for the two studies we obtain CD to be ≈ 203 and ≈ 110),
he will manage to access the system. We note that having m = 1 is very nice as for the
typical password guessing scenario, we need to have a small m to avoid complications
of blocking accounts and triggering an alarm that the system is under an attack.
5 On the phase transition
Given the experience of the previous applications, we can see that for “regular” dis-
tributions, the optimal m falls from m = n to the minimal m as the bias of the dis-
3 https://xato.net/passwords/more-top-worst-passwords/#.VNiORvnF-xW
4 http://www.imperva.com/docs/WP_Consumer_Password_Worst_Practices.pdf
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tribution increases. We let n1 be such that p1 = p2 = · · · = pn1 6= pn1+1 and n2 be
such that pn1+1 = · · · = pn1+n2 6= pn1+n2+1. Due to Lemma 26, the magic value m
can only be n1, n1 + n2, or more. We study here when the curves of CD(1n12n1 · · · ),
CD(1n1+n22n1+n2 · · · ), and CU(1n) = n+12 cross each other.
Lemma 28. We consider a composite distribution D1 = αU1 + βU2 +(1−α−β)D′,
where U1 and U2 are uniform of support n1 and n2. For U uniform, we have
CD(1n12n1 · · · )≤CD(1n1+n22n1+n2 · · · )⇐⇒ α−β n1
n2
≥ α
(
α+β 1− n1/n2
2
)
CD(1n12n1 · · ·)≤CU(1n)⇐⇒ n/n1 + 12 ≥
1
α
Note that for 2−H∞ ≥ 2
n
, we have α
n1
≥ 2
n
so the second property is satisfied.
As an example, for n1 = n2 = 1, the first condition becomes α−β ≥ α2 which is
the case of all the distribution we tried for password recovery. The second condition
becomes 2−H∞ ≥ 2
n+1 , which is also always satisfied.
For LPN, we have n1 = 1, n2 = k, α = (1−τ)k, and β = n2τ(1−τ)k−1. The first and
second conditions become
(1− τ)k ≤ 1− 2τ
1+ k−32 τ
and (1− τ)k ≥ 2
2k + 1
respectively. They are always satisfied unless τ is very close to 12 : by letting τ =
1
2 − ε
with ε→ 0, the right-hand term of the first condition is asymptotically equivalent to 8εk+1
and the left-hand term tends towards 2−k. The balance is thus for τ ≈ 12 − k+18 2−k. The
second condition gives
τ≤ 1−
(
2k + 1
2
)− 1k
=
1
2
− ln2
2k − o
(
1
k
)
So, we can explain the phase transition in LPNk,τ as follows: if we make τ decrease
from 12 , for each fixed m, the complexity of all possible CD(1
m) smoothly decrease. The
function for m = n1 crosses the one of m = n1 +n2 before it crosses n+12 which is close
to the value of the one for m = n. So, the curve for m = n1 becomes interesting after
having beaten the curve for m = n1 + n2. This proves that we never have a magic m
equal to n1 +n2. Presumably, it is the case for all other curves as well. This explains the
abrupt fall from m = n to m = 1 which we observed on Fig. 1.
Proof. We have
CD(1n12n1 · · · ) = CD(1
n1)
PrD(1n1)
=
α n1+12 +(1−α)n1
α
and
CD(1n1+n22n1+n2 · · · ) = CD(1
n1+n2)
PrD(1n1+n2)
=
α n1+12 +β
(
n1 +
n2+1
2
)
+(1−α−β)(n1+ n2)
α+β
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so
CD(1n1)
PrD(1n1)
≤ CD(1
n1+n2)
PrD(1n1+n2)
⇐⇒
α n1+12 +(1−α)n1
α
≤
α n1+12 +β
(
n1 +
n2+1
2
)
+(1−α−β)(n1+ n2)
α+β ⇐⇒
α−β n1
n2
≥ α
(
α+β 1− n1/n2
2
)
For the second property, we have
CD(1n12n1 · · ·)≤CU(1n)⇐⇒ CD(1
n1)
PrD(1n1)
≤CU (1n)
⇐⇒ α
n1+1
2 +(1−α)n1
α
≤ n+ 1
2
⇐⇒ n/n1 + 1
2
≥ 1
α
⊓⊔
6 Conclusions
Our framework enables the analysis of different strategies to sequentialize algorithms
when the objective is to make one succeed as soon as possible.
When the algorithms have the same distribution and are unlimited in number, the
optimal strategy is of form 1m2m · · · for some magic m. As the distribution becomes
biased, we observe a phase transition from the regular single-algorithm run 1n (i.e.,
m = n) to the single-step multiple algorithms 123 · · · (i.e., m = 1) which is very abrupt
in the application we considered: LPN and password recovery.
The phase transition phenomenon is further studied. In particular, we show that the
fall from m = n to m = 1 does not go through any m ∈ {2, . . . , k(k+1)2 }.
For LPN, the solving algorithm we obtain outperforms the classical ones.
When we have a limited number of algorithms, the optimal strategy has the form
1m1 · · · |D|m1 1m2 · · · |D|m2 · · · . For LPN, this simple algorithm outperforms the classical
ones, even the one from Asiacrypt 2014 [12] for the relevant parameters using τ∼ k− 12 .
A Composite distributions
We give a formula to compute the optimal strategies for distributions obtained by com-
posing several distributions. The formula is useful when we want to regroup equal
consecutive p j’s in a distribution D1 so that D1 appears as a composition of uniform
distributions.
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Lemma 29. Let U1, . . . ,Uk be independent distributions of support n1, . . . ,nk, respec-
tively. Let Ui = (pi,1, . . . , pi,ni). Given a distribution (α1, . . . ,αk) of support k, we define
D1 = α1U1 +α2U2 + . . .+αkUk by D1 = (α1 p1,1, . . . ,α1 p1,n1 ,α2 p2,1, . . . ,αk pk,nk).
Let m = ∑ij=1 n j. We have
Pr
D1
(1n11n2 · · ·1ni) = α1 + · · ·+αi
CD1(1
n11n2 · · ·1ni) =
i
∑
j=1
α jCU j (1
n j)+
i
∑
j=1
n j
(
1−
j
∑
k=1
αk
)
We note that if all Ui are ordered and if αi pi,ni ≥ αi+1 pi+1,1 for all 1≤ i < k, then D1 is
ordered as well.
We let D = (D1,D1, . . .). If we assume that Ui are uniform distributions, we can use
the observation following Lemma 26 to deduce from Th. 17 that the optimal strategy is
1m2m · · · for m = ∑ij=1 n j and i minimizing
minCD( /0) = min
i

∑ij=1 α jCU j (1n j)+∑ij=1 n j
(
1−∑ jk=1 αk
)
∑ij=1 α j


Proof. We prove it by induction on i. It is trivial for i = 0. We assume the result holds
for i− 1. By induction, we have
CD1(1
n1 · · ·1ni) =CD1(1n1 · · ·1ni−1)+ (1−PrD1(1
n1 · · ·1ni−1))CD1(1ni |¬(1n1 · · ·1ni−1))
=
i−1
∑
j=1
α jCU j (1
n j)+
i−1
∑
j=1
n j
(
1−
j
∑
k=1
αk
)
+αiCUi(1
ni)+ ni
(
1−
i
∑
k=1
αk
)
=
i
∑
j=1
α jCU j (1
n j)+
i
∑
j=1
n j
(
1−
j
∑
k=1
αk
)
The second equality is obtained from the fact that
CD1(1
ni |¬(1n1 · · ·1ni−1)) = αi
αi + · · ·+αk (pi,1 + 2pi,2 + . . .+ nipi,ni)+ ni(
αi+1 + · · ·+αk
αi + · · ·+αk )
=
αi
1−PrD1(1n1 · · ·1ni−1)
CUi(1
ni)+ ni(
1−PrD1(1n1 · · ·1ni−1)−αi
1−PrD1(1n1 · · ·1ni−1)
)
⊓⊔
B Proof of Lemma 25
Proof. We will show below that there exists d > 0 such that a ≤ b− d and CD(s) =
CD(u jd iav jb−dw). Hence, we can rewrite s by replacing u by u jd and b by b−d. Since
d > 0 and a≤ b−d, we can just apply this rewriting rule enough time until b is lowered
down to a. Hence, we obtain the result.
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To find d, we first write s = u0im1 u1im2 · · · imr uriav jbw where i appears in no ut , the
mt are nonzero, and u1, . . . ,ur are non-empty. (Note that since a < b, we must have
m1 + · · ·+mr > 0 so r ≥ 1.) Let n′ be the equal number of occurrences of i and j in
uiav jb. Let t be the smallest index such that m1 + · · ·+mt > n′− b. (For t = 0, the left-
hand term is 0 but n′ ≥ b; for t = r, the left-hand term is n′−a and we know that a < b;
so, t exists and t > 0.) We write mt = m′+d such that m1 + · · ·+mt−1 +m′ = n′−b. So,
d > 0. Note that b−d = b−mt +m′ = n′−m1−·· ·−mt = mt+1 + · · ·+mr +a. So, b−
d ≥ a. Clearly, d ≤ b. We write s = HidBiav jdT with head H = u0im1 u1im2 · · ·ut−1im′ ,
body B= ut imt+1 · · · imr ur, and tail T = jb−dw. Clearly, H has n′−b occurrences of i and
HidBiav has n′− b occurrences of j. Since s is optimal for D, idBiav jd is optimal for
D|¬H. We note that B does not start with i (t is between 1 and r and ut is nonempty and
with no i) and that iav is non-empty and with no j (either a 6= 0 or v is nonempty and
with no j). We split idBiav jd = idx1 · · ·xℓiay1 · · ·yℓ′ jd where two consecutive blocks in
the list id ,x1, . . . ,xℓ, ia,y1, . . . ,yℓ′ , jd have no key in common. (For a = 0, we can always
split so that xℓ and y1 have no key in common by using the first term k of v which is not
the last of u: we just take y1 as a block of k’s and xℓ as a block with no k.) We can apply
Lemma 24 and obtain
CD(id |¬in′−b)
PrD(id |¬in′−b)
≤ CD(i
a|¬in′−a)
PrD(ia|¬in′−a)
≤ CD(y1|¬· · · )
PrD(y1|¬· · · ) ≤
CD(yℓ′ |¬· · · )
PrD(yℓ′ |¬· · · )
≤ CD( j
d |¬ jn′−b)
PrD( jd |¬ jn′−b)
Since the first and the last terms are equal, all of them are equal. So, we can permute
two consecutive blocks which have no index in common. Hence, we can propagate jd
earlier until it is stepped before ia, since we know there is no other occurrence of j in
the exchanged blocks. We obtain that
CD(HidBiav jdT ) =CD(HidB jd iavT )
as announced. ⊓⊔
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